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Abstract—Resource allocation is the process of optimizing the
rare resources. In the area of security, how to allocate limited
resources to protect a massive number of targets is especially
challenging. This paper addresses this resource allocation issue
by constructing a game theoretic model. A defender and an
attacker are players and the interaction is formulated as a trade-
off between protecting targets and consuming resources. The
action cost which is a necessary role of consuming resource,
is considered in the proposed model. Additionally, a bounded
rational behavior model (Quantal Response, QR), which simu-
lates a human attacker of the adversarial nature, is introduced
to improve the proposed model. To validate the proposed model,
we compare the different utility functions and resource allocation
strategies. The comparison results suggest that the proposed
resource allocation strategy performs better than others in the
perspective of utility and resource effectiveness.
Index Terms—limited resource allocation, action cost, game
theoretic model, quantal response, target security
I. INTRODUCTION
Resource allocation has always been a complex problem,
especially when driven by security requirements. How to
devise a mechanism to control the trade-off between the cost
of protection and the achieved security utility is an open
challenge [1]. In the AWS re:Invent 2014, the AWS engineer
claimed that Amazon had nearly 28 total sets across the world,
each of which has one or more data centers with a typical
facility containing 50,000 to 80,000 servers [2]. To protect
these servers against attack and maintain their consistent op-
eration, cloud providers will implement security strategy. For
example, they can protect targets (eg. virtual machines, VMs)
by setting up resource reservations to analyze the operation of
targets and then respond the attack quickly, which is followed
by a lot of resource consumption [3]. Therefore, a trade-off
problem could be abstracted between consuming resources and
protecting targets. Especially, when the number of available
resources or resource budget is fixed and limited for all the
targets, how to allocate limited resources to protect a massive
number of targets is a vital issue in the security area.
The extreme approach may be to allocate security resources
to cover all the targets [4]. For instance, setting up the full
resource reservations for all the VMs, which will lead to
almost double resource consumption. The common approach
may be to protect those targets with the most value [5]. For
instance, setting up the resource reservation for the VMs that
store the most data or the sensitive data (eg. financial data).
The former approach fails to consider resource constraints
and effectiveness, however, the available resources may not
be sufficient to protect all the targets on the one hand, on
the other hand, resources allocated to some empty targets
may be inefficient. The latter approach does not account for
the adversarial nature and perspective-taking of the attacker.
An attacker who can learn about a defender’s possible target
protection strategy can exploit this knowledge to launch an
attack on the targets that the defender does not protect.
This paper focuses on developing a general resource alloca-
tion method to address the trade-off between security gain and
resource consumption. The goal is to resolve the problem of
how to utilize limited resources to efficiently protect massive
targets against attack. How to build a mathematical model
to describe this problem is the key. For example: (1) How
to maintain security while allocating resources? (2) How to
simulate an attacker of the adversarial nature?
In the previous studies [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], the number
of allocated resources is measured by defense probability. But
the importance and emphasis of resource allocation weakens
in such scheme. In general, performing different actions on
a target will result in different outcomes. If an action is
successful, the actor will obtain some benefit as a reward;
otherwise, the actor will lose some assets as a penalty. No
matter whether an action is successful, the actor will incur
some cost by taking the action. Recent studies about the effort
of deterrence and risk preferences in the security games [11],
[12] have analyzed the impact of risk preference on the defense
effort and deterrence level, and the impact of defender’s cost
on the investment strategy. Meanwhile, statistics show that a
large data center costs between $10 million and $25 million
per year and the corresponding maintenance costs account for
nearly 80% of its total cost [13]. So it’s clear that action cost is
an important factor which cannot be ignored. By combining
the rewards, penalties, costs and probabilities of actions in
some manner, it may be possible to describe our problem.
Game theory, an important tool for analyzing real-world
resource allocation problems, such as the assignment of cyber
analysts [5] and patrolling strategies [14], [15], provides an
alternative solution. However, in most of the previous studies
[6], [7], [8], [9] on game theoretic resource allocation, only
the reward and penalty associated with an action have been
included in the game utility function, but the action cost has
been ignored. In the real world, no matter what one wants
to do, an action cost is often necessary. This cost might
be measured in monetary units, physical resources, abstract
resources and so on. Whatever it is, it can be abstracted as a
mathematical expression. Hence, we include cost additionally
in the Stackelberg game [16] utility function, and analyze
the impact of different parameter value configurations on the
defender’s utility.
Since both the defender and attacker are intelligent and
have the perspective-taking ability, we consider an interaction
in which the defender designs a resource allocation strategy
first and the attacker subsequently develops an attack strategy.
Although the attacker has the ability to consider the situation
from the perspective of the defender, the attacker might also
take abrupt actions that lie outside the defender’s expectations.
This type of attacker, who is of the adversarial nature, can
be simulated by the quantal response (QR) model, which
has received widespread support in the literature on modeling
human behavior in games [17]. In this paper, we introduce
it into the proposed Game Theoretic Resource Allocation
(GTRA) model to simulate adversarial reasoning.
The efficient resource allocation strategy for the defender
is obtained from an optimization algorithm. Three indicators,
namely vulnerability, coverage and effectiveness, are designed
to evaluate the effectiveness of our strategy. We compare the
equilibrium strategy based on the proposed GTRA with the
one based on a game utility function without considering the
action cost. And also compare with four extreme resource
allocation strategies, namely average allocation strategy, par-
tial allocation strategy, random allocation strategy and full-
coverage strategy. The experimental results demonstrate the
effectiveness of our proposed GTRA model.
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows:
(1) To emphasize the action cost in resource consumption.
The players’ action costs are included in the game utility
function as an independent item. The numerical analyses
prove that this type of resource measurement can improve
the utility and effectiveness.
(2) To better balance target security and resource consump-
tion. The obtained Nash equilibrium strategy is selected
as the defender’s resource allocation strategy because it
outperforms the other extreme resource allocation strate-
gies in terms of both security and effectiveness.
(3) The constructed GTRA model provides advice based
on the target parameters to assist in determining the
appropriate quantity of resources to protect a massive
number of targets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II and section III describe the related work on resource allo-
cation and our problem, respectively. Game theoretic model,
QR model and the proposed algorithm are presented in section
IV. The numerical analyses are discussed in section V. The
final section summarizes the paper and outlines directions for
future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Resource allocation is defined as the economical distribution
of resources among competing groups of people or programs
[1]. Game theory has been applied in resource allocation to
better capture the interaction between resource provider and
user, and show the economic nature of resource allocation.
The previous studies can be roughly classified into two cate-
gories based on the different participants considered: security-
driven resource allocation between a resource provider and
an attacker; and demand-driven resource allocation between a
resource provider and a legitimate user.
Demand-driven resource allocation can be further subdi-
vided into cost-scheme-based, performance-scheme-based and
mixed-scheme-based resource allocation. The original pricing
scheme is used for the allocation of resources of a single type,
such as bandwidth [18], [19], [20], offload [21], [22], or cache
[23]. With the development of the Internet, resource provider
could provide nearly all the resources that users need, such
as cloud computing provider provides on-demand resources
including storage, memory, bandwidth and so on. Multi-
resource pricing schemes [24], such as the cost-optimized
scheme considering multiple resources [25], have emerged.
Meanwhile, since user requests are becoming necessary while
providing service, some research has focused on user-demand-
driven resource allocation [26], [27], [28]. Later, the cost-
optimized and performance-based schemes are combined to
allow a resource provider to achieve a win-win objective in
which resource provider obtains the maximum profit while the
user receives the best experience [29], [13], [30], [31].
However, during the pursuit of the best experience and the
maximum benefit, security issues increase, and security-driven
resource allocation become a research hotspot, especially when
resources are limited and cannot cover all the targets that re-
quire protection. The American institute Teamcore conducted
a project with the theme of ”AI and game theory for public
safety and security”, and their achievements have been applied
in various areas. ARMOR [32] was deployed to develop
randomized checkpoints and a patrol route strategy at Los
Angeles International Airport. GUARDS [33] was developed
to assist airports in allocating limited air police resources
to protect more than 400 United States airports. Federal Air
Marshals used IRIS [34] to provide scheduling coverage for
potential attacks. PROTECT [35] was deployed to generate
randomized patrolling schedules for the US Coast Guard.
These cases are typical instances of limited security resource
allocation using game theoretic model.
Other game theoretic studies have also produced good
results. One study [5] investigated an intelligent allocation
method for assigning limited cyber analysts to analyze a
massive number of security alerts in a network. Another
work [10] developed new models and algorithms that could
scale to highly complex instances of limited security resource
allocation games. Their new methods performed faster than
known algorithms when solving massive security games. In
further research [6] based on a previous work [7], efficient
algorithms were developed to compute the best responses of
security forces to different adversary models when resources
are limited, and it was proven that the proposed response
strategy was superior because it relaxed the assumption of
perfect rationality. An additional study [8] proposed a game
theoretic scheme for developing dynamic and randomized
security strategies that consider an adversary’s surveillance ca-
pabilities. The experimental results showed that the proposed
algorithm outperformed the existing approaches.
Although these works have utilized the nature and principles
of game theory to determine optimal resource allocation strate-
gies, most of them considered only rewards and penalties in
their allocation strategies. Recent works [11], [12] specially
examined the effect of risk preferences on deterrence, and
analyzed the impact of the defender’s cost on its investment,
which demonstrated that the cost of actions cannot be ignored.
Nonetheless, in the previous works [5], [6], [7], [8], [9],
[10], the action cost was measured by defense probability
simply, which inclines to analyze the impact of defense instead
of action cost. Therefore, the game theoretic approach that
includes the action cost independently is required to perform
the resource allocation in the security area.
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
This paper considers a common scenario of a defender
and an attacker. The defender’s responsibility is to protect
the security of N targets using M resources, so it allocates
resources to targets as its action. By contrast, the attacker’s
intention is to attack the targets, and such attack also costs
resources. For both sides, the benefit of consuming resources
can be measured in terms of the security gain. The resources
can be computing, storage, energy or even monetary units, and
the security gain indicates the return of protecting the targets
by consuming resource. Although the units of resources and
returns are different, they can be abstracted into the numerical
value by mathematical methods. In this paper, we put emphasis
on analyzing the relationship between them by setting various
parameter configurations to simulate the different scenarios.
For example, if the defender allocates resources to a target i,
this target will be relatively more secure than a target without
being covered by resources, which can be configured with a
bigger security gain.
Therefore, the defender obtains a security gain by expending
resources, which can be abstracted as a limited resource alloca-
tion problem, that is, the problem of how the defender should
allocate M resources to protect N when M is far less than
N . The defender wants to achieve the greatest security gain
while minimizing resource consumption. Therefore, this is a
trade-off problem between protecting targets and consuming
resources. Table I lists the parameters used in this paper.
T = {1, ..., i, ...N} is the set of active targets; i denotes one
target; Rmi and P
m
i are the defender’s reward and penalty,
respectively, for an attack on this target; and Cai and C
m
i
are the resources required to be expended by the attacker
and the defender, respectively, to best protect target i. A is
the attacker, who commits to a strategy p = {p1, p2, ..., pN},
where pi is the probability of an attack on target i. D is the
defender, who commits to a strategy q = {q1, q2, ..., qN},
where qi is the probability of protecting target i. We take∑
i∈T qiC
m
i ≤M to represent the constraint of the defender’s
available resources, where qiC
m
i represents the resources
allocated to target i and M represents the maximum quantity
of available resources.
TABLE I
Parameter descriptions
Parameter Description
T set of targets
N number of targets in T
A attacker
D defender
pi attack probability for target i
qi defense probability for target i
Cm
i
resources allocated to protect target i
M maximum quantity of available resources
In this way, our problem is transformed into computing
a reasonable defense probability distribution subject to the
defender’s resource constraints based on known parameters,
including the resource constraints, the number of targets, the
reward for protection, the penalty of protection, the cost of
protection and the cost of attack for the set of targets.
IV. MODEL FORMULATION
To solve the given problem, we construct a Game Theoretic
Resource Allocation (GTRA) model, as shown in Fig. 1. The
input parameters are discussed in the above section. After the
parameters are input, the proposed GTRA model computes
the defender’s possible defense probability distribution and the
attacker’s possible attack probability distribution.
For the computation process, a Stackelberg game is used to
model the interaction between the defender and attacker. Then,
the game payoff functions are built from the input parameters
and are designed as strategic rules. Next, the QR model is used
to simulate an attacker of the adversarial nature. In addition, an
iterative genetic algorithm is utilized to obtain the equilibrium
game strategy.
A. Stackelberg Game
Game theory [16] is widely used to analyze problems in
which all players who are in a conflict with a payoff attempt to
win or to maximize their payoffs via changing their strategies
based on the reactions of their adversaries. A Stackelberg game
is a common game instance in which players select strategies
sequentially: the leader moves first, and the follower responds
accordingly.
In this paper, defender and attacker are the two rival roles.
They are in conflict over the targets’ security, and both
attempt to maximize their own payoffs by allocating the fewest
resources to the targets. Through game theoretical deduction,
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Fig. 1. The game theoretic resource allocation interface.
the defender first decides how to allocate resources to cover
the targets; then, the attacker selects the targets to attack after
observing the defender’s strategy. The rivalry, the pursuit of
the maximum payoffs and the sequence of actions make our
problem fit perfectly into the framework of a Stackelberg
game; thus, the GTRA model is built based on a Stackelberg
game.
In a Stackelberg game, each player selects the action with
the greatest payoff, which is defined as the player’s return
after taking the selected action. This payoff usually consists
of reward, penalty and cost. In the proposed GTRA model,
both the defender and the attacker can take two actions, so
their payoffs for a target i can be represented by a 2 × 2
payoff matrix, as shown in Table II. Clearly, there are four
cases corresponding to the attacker’s two actions (Attack or
Not) and the defender’s two actions (Protect or Not), which
are represented by the four cells. Each cell contains two values
separated by a comma: the first is the attacker’s payoff, and
the second is the defender’s. In contrast to previous payoff
matrices, we include action cost to measure the resource
allocation metric directly.
TABLE II
PAYOFFS OF THE TWO PLAYERS FOR TARGET i
Protect (qi) Not Protect (1− qi)
Attack
(pi)
−αP a
i
+ (1 − α)Ra
i
− Ca
i
,
αP a
i
− (1− α)Ra
i
− Cm
i
Ra
i
− Ca
i
,
−Ra
i
Not Attack
(1− pi)
0 , −Cm
i
0 , 0
Case 1: {Attack, Protect}. The attacker launches an attack
on target i, and the defender protects it simultaneously. In
this case, the attacker’s benefit is −αP ai + (1 − α)R
a
i , and
the defender’s benefit is αP ai + (1 − α)R
a
i , where α is the
accuracy of attack prediction, P ai is the attack penalty, and
Rai is the attack reward.
Case 2: {Attack, Not Protect}. The attacker launches an
attack on target i, and the defender does not protect it. In this
case, the attacker will not be punished, and its payoff is the
difference between Rai and the cost. The defender’s payoff is
−Rai alone, without a cost, because no protection is attempted.
Case 3: {Not Attack, Protect}. The attacker does not launch
an attack on target i, but the defender protects it. In this case,
the attacker’s payoff is zero due to the absence of an attack,
and the defender’s payoff is the negative value corresponding
to the cost of the consumed security resources, −Cmi , with no
benefit.
Case 4: {Not Attack, Not Protect}. The attacker does not
launch an attack on target i, and the defender does not protect
it. In this case, each player’s payoff is zero because neither
performs an action.
To distinguish different targets, one work [36] considered
targets with different noncorrelated security assets. Motivated
by that study, we label targets with different security assets
in the form of distinct rewards, penalties and action costs
for the defender and attacker. A player’s total payoff is the
combination of the four separate cases. In combination with
the attack probability, defense probability and payoff items
shown in Table II, the total payoff functions of the defender
and the attacker are given in (1) and (2), respectively. These
two utility functions are different from the utility functions
used in many previous studies because the players’ action costs
are directly included in our utility functions.
UM =
∑
i∈T
piqi[αP
a
i − (1− α)R
a
i − C
m
i ]− pi(1− qi)R
a
i
−(1− pi)qiC
m
i =
∑
i∈T
qi[αpi(P
a
i +R
a
i )− C
m
i ]− piR
a
i
(1)
UA =
∑
i∈T
piqi[−αP
a
i + (1− α)R
a
i − C
a
i ] + pi(1 − qi)∗
(Rai − C
a
i ) =
∑
i∈T
pi[−αqi(P
a
i +R
a
i ) + (R
a
i − C
a
i )]
(2)
For both the defender and the attacker, the objective of each
player is to maximize that player’s own payoff by designing an
optimal strategy. When both players achieve their maximum
payoffs, the corresponding solution to the problem is called
the Nash equilibrium [16].
Definition Consider a gameG = {s1, .., sn;u1, ..., un} with
n players. If, for a strategy profile {s∗1, ..., s
∗
n}, the strategy
s∗i for every player i is either the optimal strategy for that
player or a strategy that is no worse than any of the other
(n − 1) strategies, then that strategy profile is called a Nash
equilibrium (NE) strategy profile.
The NE of a Stackelberg game can be derived by applying
backward induction [37], which involves reasoning from the
end of a situation to determine the sequence of optimal
strategies. In this context, we deduce the defender’s protection
strategy in a forward manner from the attacker’s situation in
each round, as follows.
Follower: Attacker side. The attacker observes the de-
fender’s strategy and designs a greedy strategy to maximize
its payoff. Formally, for any given q ∈ SM , the attacker’s task
is to solve the optimization problem in (3).
p(q) = argmaxUA(p, q(p))
Subject to 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1
(3)
Leader: Defender side. The defender knows that the at-
tacker will respond greedily. Therefore, the defender designs
a protection strategy based on the attacker’s potentially best
response. Formally, the defender needs to solve the optimiza-
tion problem in (4). The first constraint suggests that the total
quantity of resources available to the defender is no more than
M .
q(p) = argmaxUM (p(q), q)
Subject to
∑
i∈T
qiC
m
i ≤M
and 0 ≤ qi ≤ 1
(4)
We derive the NE from the above two sequential steps.
We derive q* by solving (4); then, p∗ is derived as p(q∗) by
solving (3). Finally, the strategy combination (p∗, q∗) is the
equilibrium game strategy for the Stackelberg game, and the
final resources allocated to target i will be q∗ ∗ Cmi .
B. Quantal Response
The previous analysis is performed under the assumption
that the attacker is perfectly rational and develops its strategy
with complete knowledge of the defender’s strategy. However,
in the real world, the attacker will not always be perfectly
rational since the attacker cannot always know the defender’s
strategy. Consequently, the defender is unsure whether the
attacker will operate according to the predictive strategy p(q).
If the attacker is not perfectly rational and chooses a strategy
that deviates slightly from the rational strategy, the defender’s
payoff may decrease. Clearly, the defender is unwilling to
accept a lower payoff while doing nothing.
To simulate the bounded rational adversary, many behav-
ior models have been proposed, including quantal response
(QR), SUQR, prospect theory (PT) and so on, which are all
commonly used. The defender’s response to them in the game
theoretic model has been done in our previous work [38] and
we found the defender’s response to the QR model is the most
careful where the defense probability is relatively bigger than
the other two bounded rational models. Hence, the QR model
is introduced into the GTRA model to simulate the attacker’s
adversarial nature and to improve the proposed model.
When the QR model is applied, the noise in a bounded
rational attacker’s strategy is controlled by λ. λ = 0 represents
a uniform random probability distribution over the attacker’s
possible strategies, while λ −→ ∞ represents a perfectly
rational attacker. Thus, the attacker’s probability of attacking
target i is changed to (5).
pi =
eλUA(qi)∑n
j=1 e
λUA(qj)
(5)
Furthermore, the defender’s utility function becomes (6).
UM =
∑
i∈T
qi ∗ [αpi(P
a
i +R
a
i )− C
m
i ]− piR
a
i
=
∑
i∈T
[
[αqi(P
a
i +R
a
i )−R
a
i ]∗e
−λ[αqi(P
a
i +R
a
i )−(R
a
i −C
a
i )]
∑
n
j=1
e
−λ[αqj(P
a
j
+Raj
)−(Raj
−Caj
)] − qi C
m
i ]
(6)
In summary, the proposed GTRA model is used to solve the
defender’s problem of how to allocate M units of resources to
maximize the defender’s utility function, as illustrated in (7).
max
q UM s.t.
{ ∑
i∈T
qiC
m
i ≤M
0 ≤ qi ≤ 1, ∀i
(7)
C. Algorithm
Since the defender’s objective utility function expressed in
(7) corresponds to a nonlinear constraint problem, the optimal
solution is extremely difficult to find. As a classic algorithm
for searching for an approximately optimal solution [39], the
genetic algorithm (GA) provides an alternative approach. GA
is a stochastic global search and optimization method that
mimics natural biological evolution. However, the typical GA
attempts to find a globally near-optimal solution instead of
a globally optimal one. Therefore, in this paper, we utilize
Algorithm 1 to compute the defender’s equilibrium strategy in
the proposed GTRA model.
Algorithm 1 Iterative Genetic Algorithm (IGA)
1: Initialization:
number of targets → N ;
number of iterations → times = 10;
resource constraint →M ;
Ud∗ ← −∞
2: Iteration:
3: while i < times do
4: (qi, Udi)← GA(MultiObj,N,M)
5: if Udi > Ud
∗ then
6: Ud∗ = Udi;
7: q∗ = qi;
8: end if
9: end while
10: return (q∗, Ud∗)
In addition to the parameters of the utility function discussed
in the previous section, the number of targets, the number of
iterations and the resource constraint are initialized before the
iteration process. In each iteration, we find the locally optimal
strategy qi and the corresponding utility Udi using the GA()
function in MATLAB. Then, we record the current maximum
after each iteration. When the iteration number i reaches the
given maximum times, the globally optimal strategy q∗i and
the corresponding utility Ud∗i are obtained. In general, the
probability of reaching the global optimum increases as the
number of iterations times increases.
To better understand the equilibrium game strategy, we illus-
trate the evolutionary behavior of the defender by adopting the
phase plane of replicator dynamics [40]. First, tersely describe
the payoff of the defender and attacker in every case, Table II
is changed into Table III where a = −αP ai +(1−α)R
a
i −C
a
i ,
b = αP ai − (1 − α)R
a
i − C
m
i , c = R
a
i − C
a
i , d = −R
a
i and
f = −Cmi . Then, the replicator dynamics equations of the
attacker and the defender are expressed as (8). U¯A and U¯M
represent the average payoffs. The evolutionary equilibrium
can then be obtained by solving the following equations p˙ = 0
and q˙ = 0.
TABLE III
Simplified payoffs for target i
Protect (q) Not Protect (1− q)
Attack (p) a, b c, d
Not Attack (1− p) 0, f 0, 0
p˙ = p(UA − U¯A) = p(1− p)[qa+ (1− q)c]
q˙ = q(UM − U¯M ) = q(1− q)[p(b − d) + (1− p)f ]
(8)
Fig. 2 presents the evolutionary equilibrium of the de-
fender’s strategy, which can be seen as the process of adapting
the initial strategy to the NE strategy. The smallest circle
around the NE point (0.012, 0.2851) is the entire feasible
region of the solution.
V. NUMERICAL STUDY
Since the focus of this paper is to explore the impact of
different parameter configurations, we perform the numerical
analysis directly to validate the proposed method. We first
compare the proposed utility function with the utility function
that does not consider the action cost. Then, we compare the
NE strategy that is computed based on the proposed utility
function with four other resource allocation strategies. In each
group of experiments, 100 game instances under the same
conditions are considered, and the average value is taken as
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Fig. 2. Evolution process of the defender’s behavior.
the result. In each game instance, the number of iterations in
Algorithm 1 is set to 10 1, and the maximum value is taken.
A. Comparison of Utility Functions
To assess the impact of the action cost on the strategy,
we compare the utility functions with and without action
cost, respectively. Specifically, to explore the influence of the
relationship between the two players’ action costs on each
player’s strategy, we design three groups of experiments, as
shown in Table IV.
TABLE IV
Four utility function scenarios
No. Relation Cm Ca
1 Cm
i
> Ca
i
γ < Cm
i
< 2 ∗ γ 0 < Ca
i
< γ
2 Cm
i
< Ca
i
0 < Cm
i
< γ γ < Ca
i
< 2 ∗ γ
3 Cm
i
= Ca
i
0 < Cm
i
< γ Ca
i
= Cm
i
4 NoCost γ = 0 γ = 0
The first scenario corresponds to a utility function in which
the cost of defense is greater than the cost of attack. On the
contrary, the second scenario corresponds to a utility function
in which the cost of attack is greater than the cost of defense.
The third scenario corresponds to a utility function in which
the costs of attack and the cost of defense are equal and are
greater than 0. The fourth scenario corresponds to the utility
function used in previous works [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10],
in which the action costs Cai and C
m
i are 0 and the resource
consumption is simply the sum of the defense probabilities.
We measure the solution quality in each scenario in terms
of the defender’s average utility and the average effectiveness
over all 100 game instances, where the effectiveness is defined
as the average number of protected targets per resource, as
shown in (9). The growth rate, defined in (10), is used to
measure the difference in solution quality between different
utility function scenarios, where a denotes the solution quality
for a utility function without action cost and b denotes the
solution quality for a utility function that includes the action
cost.
The parameters used in this paper are the same as those
used in the previous study [9], where reward Rai is chosen
randomly from a uniform distribution from 1 to 10, penalty
P ai is chosen randomly from a uniform distribution from -10
to -1 and the resource constraint is proportional to the number
of targets, M = γ ∗ N . We assume that the total available
resources, including the total cost, are insufficient to protect
all targets. Therefore, the value of parameter γ is set to less
than 1.
effectiveness =
number of covered targets
consumed resources
(9)
Growth Rate =
a− b
b
(10)
1We conducted an experiment with 100 iterations and found that the
maximum value was usually found within the first ten iterations.
Cm
-big
ger
-Co
st
Equ
al-C
ost
Ca-
big
ger
-Co
st
No
Cos
t
Utility Functions
0
10
20
30
D
ef
en
de
r's
 U
tili
ty
 (U
m) N = 50N = 100
N = 200
N = 300
N = 400
(a) Defender’s utility comparison
(ratio = 0.1)
Cm
-big
ger
-Co
st
Equ
al-C
ost
Ca-
big
ger
-Co
st
No
Cos
t
Utility Functions
0
10
20
30
40
50
D
ef
en
de
r's
 U
tili
ty
 (U
m) ratio = 0.1ratio = 0.2
ratio = 0.3
ratio = 0.4
(b) Defender’s utility comparison
(N = 200)
Cm
-big
ger
-Co
st
Equ
al-C
ost
Ca-
big
ger
-Co
st
No
Cos
t
Utility Functions
0
10
20
30
40
D
ef
en
de
r's
 R
es
ou
rc
e N = 50N = 100
N = 200
N = 300
N = 400
(c) Resource comparison (ratio =
0.1)
Cm
-big
ger
-Co
st
Equ
al-C
ost
Ca-
big
ger
-Co
st
No
Cos
t
Utility Functions
0
20
40
60
80
D
ef
en
de
r's
 R
es
ou
rc
e ratio = 0.1
ratio = 0.2
ratio = 0.3
ratio = 0.4
(d) Resource comparison (N =
200)
Cm
-big
ger
-Co
st
Equ
al-C
ost
Ca-
big
ger
-Co
st
No
Cos
t
Utility Functions
0
20
40
60
Ef
fe
ct
ive
ne
ss
N = 50
N = 100
N = 200
N = 300
N = 400
(e) Effectiveness comparison (ra-
tio = 0.1)
Cm
-big
ger
-Co
st
Equ
al-C
ost
Ca-
big
ger
-Co
st
No
Cos
t
Utility Functions
0
20
40
60
Ef
fe
ct
ive
ne
ss
ratio = 0.1
ratio = 0.2
ratio = 0.3
ratio = 0.4
(f) Effectiveness comparison (N
= 200)
Fig. 3. Solution quality comparison of different utility functions.
Fig. 3 shows the solution quality results for the various
utility function scenarios introduced in Table IV with different
parameter configurations. The defender’s average utility, and
the defender’s resource consumption along with the effective-
ness are displayed on the y-axes. On the x-axes, Figs. 3(a),
3(c) and 3(e) show the results of varying the number of targets
(N ) while keeping the ratio (γ) of resources (M ) to N fixed
to 0.1. Figs. 3(b), 3(d) and 3(f) show the results of varying
the ratio of resources to targets while keeping the number of
targets fixed at 200. The corresponding solution qualities in
the various utility function scenarios are presented as groups
of bars.
Figs. 3(a), 3(c) and 3(e) show the following. (1) The
defender’s utility (Um) increases as the number of targets (N )
increases. The utility is larger in the first scenario than other
scenarios under the same conditions, and it is nearly stable
in the fourth scenario, regardless of N , which indicates that
the greater cost of defense has a better effect on obtaining
payoff under the same conditions. (2) The defender’s resource
consumption increases as the number of targets (N ) increases.
The resource consumption is larger in the first scenario than in
the second and third scenarios, and it is strongly proportional
to N in the fourth scenario. It illustrates the cumulative
impact of action costs on a massive number of targets. (3)
The effectiveness does not vary regularly with the number of
targets (N ); it varies inversely with the resource consumption
in the first scenario, in which the action cost is considered
in the utility function, while a nearly constant effectiveness
is maintained in the fourth scenario. It suggests that when
expending the same number of resources, the number of
protected targets of the fourth scenario where the action costs
are not considered in the utility function is the least.
Figs. 3(b), 3(d) and 3(f) show the following. (1) The
defender’s utility (Um) increases as the ratio of resources
to the number of targets increases. The defender’s utility is
larger than the second and third scenarios under the same
conditions when Cmi > C
a
i , and it is nearly stable when
there is no action cost in the utility function, regardless of
the resource-to-target ratio. It reveals that the utility functions
including action cost provide more utility than those without
action cost. Moreover, the number of resources has a positive
effect on the defender’s utility. (2) The defender’s resource
consumption increases as the resource-to-target ratio increases;
it is larger in the first scenario than in the second and third
scenarios and it is strongly proportional to the resource-to-
target ratio in the fourth scenario. It also shows the cumulative
impact of action costs on a massive number of targets. (3)
The effectiveness decreases with an increasing resource-to-
target ratio. The effectiveness varies inversely with resource
consumption in all four scenarios, and it is smaller in the first
scenario than in the second and third scenarios. It suggests
that the effectiveness decreases with the increasing number of
resources under the same conditions, and the effectiveness is
the least when the utility does not include the action cost.
Furthermore, we illustrate the difference in solution quality
when the utility function does not consider the action cost in
Fig. 4. Equation (10) shows that if the growth rate is less than
zero, then a is less than b. An overall comparative analysis
of the results shown in Fig. 4 indicates that when the utility
function does not include the action cost, the defender’s utility
and the effectiveness are lower, and the defender’s resource
consumption is larger. The difference becomes especially
evident as the number of resources increases (the resource-
to-target ratio increases) or the number of targets increases
(N increases).
Overall, a utility function that considers the action cost,
regardless of the relationship between defense and attack costs,
provides the defender with a larger payoff and higher effec-
tiveness. Additionally, although it is possible to represent the
resources allocated to targets using the defense probabilities,
as done in the utility functions implemented in many previous
studies, sometimes the resource metric is not the same as the
defense probability. For example, when 10 GB of storage is
required to run intrusion prevention servers to protect a base
station, this requirement cannot be represented as a probability.
However, we can set Cmi = 10 directly, and the defense
probability then represents the probability that this target may
be covered by this server. Hence, adding the action cost to
the utility function is beneficial. In the following sections, we
present a series of comparative analyses of various strategies
based on our proposed utility function that considers the action
50 100 200 300 400
The number of targets (N)
0
2
4
6
8
G
ro
wt
h 
ra
te
 o
f D
ef
en
de
r's
 U
tili
ty Cm-bigger-Cost
Equal-Cost
Ca-bigger-Cost
(a) Defender’s utility comparison
(ratio = 0.1)
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
The ratio of resources (M) to targets (N)
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
G
ro
wt
h 
ra
te
 o
f D
ef
en
de
r's
 U
tili
ty
Cm-bigger-Cost
Equal-Cost
Ca-bigger-Cost
(b) Defender’s utility comparison
(N = 200)
50 100 200 300 400
The number of targets (N)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
G
ro
wt
h 
ra
te
 o
f D
ef
en
se
 R
es
ou
rc
e Cm-bigger-Cost
Equal-Cost
Ca-bigger-Cost
(c) Resource comparison (ratio =
0.1)
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
The ratio of resources (M) to targets (N)
0
2
4
6
8
10
G
ro
wt
h 
ra
te
 o
f D
ef
en
se
 R
es
ou
rc
e Cm-bigger-Cost
Equal-Cost
Ca-bigger-Cost
(d) Resource comparison (N =
200)
50 100 200 300 400
The number of targets (N)
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
G
ro
wt
h 
ra
te
 o
f R
es
ou
rc
e 
Ef
fe
ct
ive
ne
ss
Cm-bigger-Cost
Equal-Cost
Ca-bigger-Cost
(e) Effectiveness comparison (ra-
tio = 0.1)
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
The ratio of resources (M) to targets (N)
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
G
ro
wt
h 
ra
te
 o
f R
es
ou
rc
e 
Ef
fe
ct
ive
ne
ss
Cm-bigger-Cost
Equal-Cost
Ca-bigger-Cost
(f) Effectiveness comparison (N
= 200)
Fig. 4. Difference in solution quality when the utility function does not
consider the action cost.
cost.
B. Comparison of Allocation Strategies
A system with high security requirements is considered;
e.g., government systems usually require a high level of
consistency and need to be able to resist various attacks. The
defender is usually equipped with high-performance defense
modules with powerful processing capabilities, so a relatively
large protection reward and a small protection penalty, which
can be represented as P ai > R
a
i [9], are chosen in our study.
Since all three scenarios regarding the relationship between
the defense cost and the attack cost have a similar impact on
the solution quality, we perform our further study based on
the case in which the defense cost is less than the attack cost
represented by Cmi < C
a
i .
We varied the reward and penalty from 1 to 10, the action
cost from 0.1 to 0.4, and the numerical gap between the
reward (or penalty) and the cost was considered large. Here,
we limit the gap between the reward (or penalty) and the
cost by randomly choosing values from Cmi ∈ [0.01, 0.02],
Cai ∈ [0.02, 0.03], P
a
i ∈ [1.4, 1.6], and P
m
i ∈ [0.4, 0.6]. These
digits can be projected to the scenario that a unit of defense
resource can protect at most 100 targets, and a unit of attack
resource can attack at most 50 targets. If an attack fails, the
attacker will get a penalty about 1.4. And if the protection
fails, the defender will get a penalty about 0.4. In this case,
the attacker can be seen as the type of risk-averse player who
aims to minimize the risk loss [12].
To further evaluate the utility function which includes the
action cost, we simulate four extreme resource allocation
strategies in which the defender does not follow the NE
strategy.
1) PartOneS strategy: The defender cannot protect all the
targets due to resource limitations, so it must select at most
k targets to protect. The remaining N − k targets are not
protected. The defense probability distribution is obtained
from (11). In this strategy, M available units of resources are
consumed.
qi =


1, i = 1, ..., k − 1;
(M −
∑k−1
j=1 qj ∗ C
m
j )/C
m
i , qj = 1, i = k;
0, i = k + 1, ..., n.
(11)
2) Rand strategy: The defender protects targets following
a random probability distribution according to (12). In this
strategy, the quantity of resources consumed is less than M .
qi =
Rand(qi)∗M∑
n
j=1 Rand(qj)∗C
m
j
, i = 1, 2, ..., n (12)
3) Average strategy: Resources are allocated to each target
equally; the defense probability distribution obeys (13). In this
strategy, all M available units of resources are consumed.
qi ∗ C
m
i = M/n, i = 1, 2, ..., n (13)
4) AllOneS strategy: The resource limitation is relaxed, and
the defender protects all targets, as expressed in (14), which
is approximately abstracted as AllOneS. In this strategy, the
quantity of resources consumed is greater than M .
qi = 1, i = 1, 2, ..., n (14)
Our strategy obtained based on the proposed GTRA model
is similar to (15). It is computed using the IGA given in Al-
gorithm 1. In our strategy, the quantity of resources consumed
is no more than M .
q = IGA(UM , n,M),
∑
qi ∗ C
m
i ≤M (15)
We start by comparing the utility of the defender with that
of the attacker. The defender’s resources are considered to be
limited, whereas the attacker’s resources are unlimited. One
hundred game instances, with the number of targets ranging
from 10 to 1000 in increments of 10, are considered.
The defender’s utility results for the different strategies are
displayed in Fig. 5. The vertical axis represents the defender’s
utility UM , and the horizontal axis shows the number of targets
N .
When the number of targets is below 120, AllOneS provides
the defender with the greatest utility. However, when the
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Fig. 5. Comparison of the defender’s utility.
number of targets exceeds 312, AllOneS provides the de-
fender with the smallest utility because of the higher resource
consumption. The NE strategy based on our GTRA model
outperforms the other four strategies when the number of
targets is greater than 120.
Interestingly, the defender’s utility decreases with an in-
creasing number of targets in Fig. 5, while the opposite trend is
seen in Fig. 3. The difference between these two configurations
is the range of parameters. When the reward or penalty is
much larger than the cost, the defender’s utility is larger, and
the impact of the number of targets is directly proportional
to the utility. By contrast, when the reward or penalty is only
slightly larger than the cost, the defender’s utility is smaller
and potentially even negative. In this case, the impact of the
number of targets is directly proportional to the utility. Hence,
the parameter configuration, such as the gap between the
reward (or penalty) and cost, influences the defender’s utility.
Regardless of the parameter configuration, the NE strategy
based on our GTRA model is better than the other strategies
in terms of the defender’s utility.
C. Comparison in Terms of Various Evaluation Criteria
The NE strategy is obtained by finding the maximum
utility for both players. In this subsection, we evaluate the
vulnerability, coverage and effectiveness of our equilibrium
strategy and the other four strategies.
1) Vulnerability: We first evaluate the vulnerability of the
defender’s various strategies. The vulnerability is defined as
a risk indicator for the targets as shown in (16) [41].
vulnerability =
success− failure
success+ failure
(16)
where success and failure denote the numbers of targets
in which an attack that is launched is not detected or is
detected, respectively. The assumption is made that if the
defender allocates resources to protect a target, then that
target will be successfully protected against attack by the
continuously operating defense system; otherwise, the attack
will be successful. Clearly, a greater success value and a lower
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Fig. 6. Vulnerability of 100 groups of instances.
failure value indicate a more vulnerable strategy. Hence, the
lower the vulnerability is, the better the strategy.
Fig. 6 shows that the vulnerability of AllOneS is −1,
which implies that the number of successes is 0. In this
situation, the targets are the most secure. The defender’s
protections cover all the targets, resulting in the most secure
environment. When the number of targets (N) is small, the
NE strategy achieves the most secure state; as N increases,
the vulnerability increases because the available resources
become insufficient to protect all targets. Additionally, once
N is greater than 400, the vulnerability of NE varies only
slightly. These analyses reveal that NE can be scaled up to
protect a large number of targets. Furthermore, compared with
PartOneS, Rand, and Average, as the number of targets to
protect increases such that there are insufficient resources to
protect all of them, NE performs better. It enables control of
the trade-off between the security benefit and the resource
consumption and focuses on protecting targets that are more
likely to be attacked.
As a result, NE performs better than all the other strategies
except for AllOneS in terms of the vulnerability of the
targets.
2) Coverage: We evaluate the allocated resources’ coverage
of the targets next. The coverage is defined as the proportion
of protected targets among the total targets, as shown in
(17), where the protected targets are defined as those that are
attacked by attacker and also protected by defender, those that
are not attacked but protected, and those that are not attacked
and not protected, either, as denoted by AP, NP and NF,
respectively, in Table V.
TABLE V
Protection type of target i
Protect Fail to Protect
Attack AP AF
Not Attack NP NF
coverage =
AP +NP +NF
N
(17)
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Fig. 7 shows the coverage results for the five strategies
for 100 groups of experimental instances. AllOneS covers all
targets by protecting all of them, whereas NE covers almost the
fewest targets because NE protects only risky targets attractive
to the attacker. Thus, the number of protected targets is smaller
than the other strategies.The disadvantage of this strategy is
that it cannot guarantee the absolute security of the targets, in
contrast to AllOneS. However, it may be useful for saving
resources or improving the effectiveness with which those
resources are used, especially when resources are valuable or
limited.
3) Effectiveness: We now evaluate the effectiveness of the
five strategies. The greater the effectiveness is, the better the
strategy is. For 100 groups of experimental instances, the
quantities of resources consumed by each strategy are plotted
in Fig. 8(b). It is worth noting that AllOneS consumes the
most resources, and NE consumes the least resources. The
resources consumed by PartOneS and Average are equivalent
since these two strategies use all the available resources. When
the number of targets is increased to 1000, the quantity of
resources consumed by AllOneS is close to four times the
resources consumed by NE. When these values are applied
to the real world, they represent a large amount of material
or financial resources that must be expended by the defender.
Consequently, our strategy aims to provide high effectiveness.
In Fig. 8(a), there is an evident upward trend in the
effectiveness of NE when the number of targets is less than
200, which then gradually drops to a stable value with an
increasing number of targets. Moreover, NE has the highest
effectiveness among all five strategies. These results suggest
that increasing the number of targets does not affect the
effectiveness. In addition, although AllOneS protects the most
targets, its effectiveness is lower than that of NE because it
consumes more resources. AllOneS may protect some targets
that are not likely to be attacked, which may cause resources
to be consumed without gaining benefits, thus decreasing the
defender’s effectiveness.
Now, we combine the number of targets, coverage and
vulnerability in Fig. 9(a) and combine the number of targets,
effectiveness and vulnerability in Fig. 9(b). From Fig. 9, it
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Fig. 8. Defender’s effectiveness.
can be concluded that more targets must be protected to
maintain a low vulnerability or to decrease the vulnerability.
However, if the defender increases the number of protected
targets, more resources will be required. Take AllOneS as an
example. The vulnerability of the targets is near zero, and
the number of protected targets is the largest, but the number
of covered targets per resource is low because of the high
resource consumption. In this situation, to improve the security
of the targets, the NE strategy obtained based on the proposed
NE model, which balances the security utility and the resource
consumption, is the best choice for allowing the defender to
utilize limited resources effectively.
D. Parameter Analysis
The security utilities of the defender and the attacker are
related not only to their strategies but also to certain specific
parameters: the resource constraintM , the prediction accuracy
α and the noise λ in the attacker’s rationality.
1) Resource constraint M : We generate 100 random game
instances with 1000 targets and consider different quantities of
resources to assess the impact of the resource constraintM on
the players’ utilities. In Fig. 10, the x-axes show the proportion
of available resources relative to the maximum resources
required, and the y-axes represent the players’ utilities.
Fig. 10 shows that when the resource proportion is zero, the
defender’s utility is the lowest, and the attacker’s utility is the
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Fig. 9. Comprehensive analysis of the number of targets, coverage,
vulnerability and effectiveness.
highest. As the proportion of available resources increases, the
defender’s utility increases, and the attacker’s utility decreases.
When the proportion reaches 40%, the utilities of both players
become stable. Hence, we conclude that for the case in
which Rmi > P
m
i and P
m
i > C
m
i , 40% of the maximum
resources is an efficient rate of utilization for the defender.
When the proportion is greater than 40%, both players’ utilities
remain approximately stable. The jitter in the raw data is due
to the aggregated analysis of resource consumption, which
demonstrates that spending more resources to protect targets
may be less risky, but the cost of the resources consumed will
exceed the benefit.
The proposed NE model can compute the corresponding
best resource proportions for different combinations of reward,
penalty and cost. Therefore, the proposed model offers the
defender an alternative means of gaining greater utility while
saving resources, thereby improving the defender’s outcome
from the perspective of economics. When the defender needs
to estimate the overall quantity of resources required to protect
a massive number of targets, the proposed GTRA model can
be used to compute the approximate quantity based on the
configurations of all the targets and thus provide the defender
with a game theoretical reference value.
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2) Prediction accuracy α: We generate 10 random game
instances with 100 targets and vary the prediction accuracy
α to assess its impact on the players’ utilities. α is the
accuracy with which attacks are predicted by the defender.
Figs. 11(a) and 11(b) show the differences in the players’
utilities with varying α values (ranging from 0 to 1). The
prediction accuracy α is plotted on the horizontal axis, and
the player’s utility is plotted on the vertical axis.
As the prediction accuracy increases, the defender’s utility
increases, and the attacker’s utility decreases. For a typical
state in which α is 0.8, the defender’s utility is -0.5323, and
the attacker’s utility is 0.411. The reason that the sum of the
defender’s utility and the attacker’s utility is not equal to zero
is that our game is a non-zero-sum game. In this paper, we
assume that the predictions are not fully accurate, so we take
α to be 0.8 without explicit explanation.
3) Noise λ in the attacker’s rationality: We generate 30
random game instances with 100 targets and vary λ to assess
its impact on the players’ utilities. λ represents the noise in the
attacker’s rationality during strategy planning. We vary λ from
0 to 15 in increments of 0.5. In Fig. 12, the two variables are
the noise λ in the attacker’s rationality and the player’s utility.
λ is the independent variable, and the utility is the dependent
variable. The change in the utility is caused by different values
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of λ.
Fig. 12 shows that the larger λ is, the greater the utility
of the attacker is and the lower the utility of the defender is.
Additionally, when λ is greater than 4, both players’ utilities
remain nearly stable with λ increasing, especially that of the
attacker. We may argue that if the attacker is sufficiently
rational (λ is sufficiently high), then the players’ utilities
are nearly constant. In this paper, to model irrational attack
behavior, the value of λ is set to 1.5 in the analysis [35].
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VI. CONCLUSION
A. Summary
In this paper, we investigate how to allocate resources
to efficiently protect targets when the number of targets
is greater than the number of resources. A game theoretic
resource allocation (GTRA) model is constructed based on a
Stackelberg game. In the proposed model, an independent item
(i.e., the action cost) is included in the game utility function
compared with the previous studies, which makes the resource
allocation more flexible and convenient. The proposed method
correlates resource allocation with security by means of the
game utility function, simulates the behavior of an attacker
of the adversarial nature through the introduction of the QR
model, and enables the computation of the Nash equilibrium
(NE) strategy through an iterative genetic algorithm.
In addressing these challenges, we draw the following
conclusions:
• Including the action cost in the utility function provides
the defender with greater utility and higher effectiveness,
regardless of the relationship between the defense cost
and the attack cost.
• The size of the gap between different parameters affects
the defender’s utility and the trend of variation in the
defender’s utility with the number of targets. Regardless
of the parameter configuration, the NE strategy based on
our GTRA model outperforms the other four resource
allocation strategies considered for comparison.
• When the available resources are not sufficient to protect
all the targets, our strategy performs better than the
random allocation strategy, the average allocation strategy
and the partial protection strategy. It can effectively
balance security and resource consumption.
• When the resource constraint is relaxed, although our
strategy cannot maintain the best target security, it nev-
ertheless achieves higher effectiveness than the one allo-
cating resources to all the targets. Thus, it can optimize
the consumption of resources for protecting targets.
• The quantity of resources and the security of the targets
are not directly related. Given a set of targets and their
corresponding asset values, the proposed model provides
advice on the quantity of resources required to effectively
protect the targets.
Given these findings, the security of targets can be better
protected by considering the cost of protection when planning
resource allocation. Last but not least, we hope that this
study can serve as a theoretical reference for the allocation
of security resources in multiple arenas.
B. Future work
Our current work focuses on designing an efficient resource
allocation strategy to protect a massive number of targets using
limited resources. Next, we plan to apply current research in an
application leveraging the idea of software-defined networking
(SDN) and network function virtualization (NFV), which is
suitable not only for common networks but also for computing
environments such as cloud computing.
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